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LOOKING INWARD: REGIONAL PARALLEL TRADE AS A
MEANS OF BRINGING AFFORDABLE DRUGS TO AFRICA
∗

Marianne Buckley

I.

INTRODUCTION

Suffering from persistent headaches and finding no relief from
aspirin, Simon traveled from his village in Kenya to Nairobi, Kenya’s
1
capital, to see a doctor. The doctor ran some tests, which confirmed
his worse fears: Simon had cryptococcal meningitis, an HIV-related
2
fungal infection that can be fatal if not treated quickly. Not only did
the doctor inform Simon that he was HIV-positive, he also explained
that the cost of the lifetime treatment for the infection was ten dollars
3
per pill. At that price, Simon would use up his entire salary in two
4
weeks. Although the same drug sold in Thailand as a generic for ten
5
cents per pill, that version was not available to Simon in Kenya. The
doctor advised Simon to return to his village without treatment, as
the cost of transporting a live body home from Nairobi would be far
6
less expensive than transporting a corpse. If the affordable generic
drug sold in Thailand had been available in Kenya, Simon may not
have had to face such a desperate situation.
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1
Rachel Cohen, Advocacy Liaison for the Médecins Sans Frontières [Doctors
Without Borders] Access to Essential Medicines Campaign, Congressional Briefing:
Solving the HIV / AIDS Drug Access Crisis in Africa: Meeting the Challenge to Save
Millions of Lives and to Mitigate the Orphan Crisis (July 16, 2001), available at
http://doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=1348.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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Although the United States prohibits the importation of cheaper
7
drugs from other countries, the search for low-priced drugs in other
areas of the world is increasingly extending beyond a country’s geographical borders. Because a drug may sell at a higher price in Country A than in Country B, a trader in Country A will purchase the drug
from Country B at a lower price and then sell the drug in Country A.
The goal of this parallel-trading system is to make drugs more affordable for consumers in Country A while generating a profit for the
trader. Kenya, in fact, permitted parallel trading beginning in
8
2001 —likely too late to help Simon, but improving the situation for
other patients.
The scenario described above outlines the contours of parallel
trade. Parallel trade is premised on the economic principle of the
free movement of goods and incorporates the patent-law concept of
9
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights. A key feature of an intellectual property system is the exclusive rights given to an inventor
to prevent others from producing, selling, or distributing his inven10
tion for a specified period of time. Exhaustion occurs when an in11
tellectual property right holder’s control over his invention ceases.
This cessation of intellectual property rights can happen in different
ways depending on the type of exhaustion doctrine the country of
12
importation has adopted.
The choice of an exhaustion doctrine correlates to the prevalence of parallel trade in a country. For example, the United States
follows the doctrine of national exhaustion, which means that an intellectual property right holder’s rights do not end until after the first

7
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1) (2006)
(“[N]o drug . . . which is manufactured in a State and exported may be imported into the United States unless the drug is imported by the manufacturer of the drug.”).
8
Ben Shianya, Patents, Parallel Importation and Compulsory Licensing of HIV / AIDS
Drugs: The Experience of Kenya, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION
CASE STUDY 19 (Peter Gallagher et al. eds., 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case19_e.htm.
9
See Commission Communication on Parallel Imports of Proprietary Medicinal Products
for Which Marketing Authorisations Have Already Been Granted, at 6, 10, COM (2003) 839
final (Dec. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Parallel Imports of Proprietary Medicinal Products].
10
JACOB ARFWEDSON, INST. FOR POL’Y INNOVATION, RE-IMPORTATION (PARALLEL
TRADE) IN PHARMACEUTICALS 1 (2004).
11
Duncan Matthews & Viviana Munoz-Tellez, Parallel Trade: A User’s Guide, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A
HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 1429, 1432 (A. Krattiger et al. eds., 2007).
12
International Exhaustion and Parallel Importation, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/export/international_exhaustion.htm
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
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13

sale of the protected product in the United States. Hence, according to the national exhaustion doctrine, a right holder cannot limit
the commercial exploitation of the product within the domestic
country, but it can still refuse to allow importation of the product
14
from other countries into the domestic market. Conversely, under
the doctrine of international exhaustion, an intellectual property
right holder’s exclusive rights cease after the first sale of the product
in any market in the world, and a right holder can no longer exclude
15
the product from entering the local market from other countries.
Thus, the type of exhaustion doctrine selected by a country will either
promote or restrict the parallel trade of goods because the doctrine
determines whether the right holder can prevent parallel imports of
16
the patented product from entering the domestic market.
Once the intellectual property rights protecting a product are
exhausted, the inventor can no longer dictate the terms governing
the sale of his product, and the notion of the free movement of
17
goods applies. The concept of the free movement of goods means
that a product may be sold in other countries without restrictions and
the right holder cannot prevent the product from entering new mar18
19
kets. The product sold in a new market is called a parallel import.
Parallel trade is driven by price differences for similar products be20
tween countries. Importantly, parallel trade does not refer to illegal
21
activities, nor should it involve the trade of counterfeit goods.
13

Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1432.
International Exhaustion and Parallel Importation, supra note 12.
15
Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1432.
16
Id.
17
See generally LENNART RITTER, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE 745–47 (3d ed. 2004) (explaining that intellectual property rights are subject
to the rules of the free movement of goods in the EU).
18
See RITTER, supra note 17, at 747 (noting that once patent rights are exhausted,
the patentee cannot prevent the importation of the goods); David R. Bumbak, Industrial Property Rights and the Free Movement of Goods in the European Communities, 16 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 381, 381 (1984) (describing the inherent tension between exclusive intellectual property rights and the free movement of goods); David T. Keeling,
The Free Movement of Goods in EEC Law: Basic Principles and Recent Developments in the
Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 26 INT’L LAW. 467, 467
(1992) (explaining that the principle of the free movement of goods means that
goods placed on a market can be freely traded throughout, for example, Europe,
and that such goods cannot be subject to any restrictions).
19
Parallel imports are also referred to as “grey market goods.” International Exhaustion and Parallel Importation, supra note 12. This Comment, however, will use the
former term.
20
Thomas N. Bart, Parallel Trade of Pharmaceuticals: A Review of Legal, Economic,
and Political Aspects, 11 VALUE IN HEALTH 996, 997 (2008); Press Release, Eur.
14
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Although parallel trade applies to all types of goods, the trade
mechanism is particularly relevant in the public health sector because
22
of conflicts over pharmaceutical drug pricing and patent rights. An
inherent tension exists between the exclusive protection granted by
23
patents and the cost of and access to drugs by consumers. This tension is apparent in the public health crisis facing places like Africa,
where the cost of drugs is high, and therefore, drugs are inaccessible
to much of the population. Importantly, although focus has primarily been on the lack of affordable drugs in developing African countries as compared to the United States and Europe, drug prices within Africa vary widely. For example, a study found that the price of a
drug sold in Uganda was 124% higher than the price of the same
24
drug sold in Ethiopia.
Even though parallel trade has the potential to cut drug costs for
25
consumers, the system is not without its critics. A common argument against parallel trade is that it hurts innovation because pharmaceutical companies are less likely to invest in research and development of new drugs if their profits decrease because of the
26
availability of cheaper drugs from other sources. Pharmaceutical
companies have actively attempted to fight parallel imports. For example, in 2007, Pfizer brought a suit against the Philippines for importing a cheaper version of its patented hypertension drug from In27
dia. Parallel trade, therefore, is as controversial as it is critical.

Comm’n, MEMO/04/7 Commission Communications on Parallel Imports of Proprietary Medicinal Products—Frequently Asked Questions (Jan. 19, 2004), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (select “Search Complete Database” under
“Date Range”; then enter “MEMO/04/7” in “Reference” field).
21
Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1429.
22
Id. at 1432–33.
23
See generally David Henry & Joel Lexchin, The Pharmaceutical Industry as a Medicines Provider, 360 LANCET 1590, 1590–93 (2002) (describing the lack of affordable
drugs in developing countries and the use and abuse of patents by pharmaceutical
companies).
24
KRISTEN MYHR, MÉDECINS SAN FRONTIÈRES, COMPARING PRICES OF ESSENTIAL
DRUGS BETWEEN FOUR COUNTRIES IN EAST AFRICA AND WITH INTERNATIONAL PRICES
(2000) (manuscript at 18) (on file with author). The generic name of the drug is
ceftriaxone.
Ceftriaxone Injection, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a685032.html (last updated Dec. 21, 2010). Ceftriaxone sold under the branded name Rocephin by Roche and is commonly used to
treat infections. Id.
25
Parallel Trade in Medicines, EURACTIV (Aug. 3, 2007), http://www.euractiv.com/
en/health/parallel-trade-medicines/article-117528 [hereinafter EURACTIV].
26
Id.
27
Elmira Bacatan, Access to Medicine: Drama Unfolding, OXFAM EAST ASIA BLOG
(May 13, 2008), http://www.oxfamblogs.org/eastasia/?p=80.
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Despite criticisms, the parallel trade of pharmaceutical drugs will
not likely disappear any time soon and, if anything, it will become
more prevalent for several reasons. First, under the Trade-Related
28
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement and the
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Dec29
laration), World Trade Organization (WTO) countries may select
the intellectual property right exhaustion doctrine that best suits
30
their domestic policy goals. The least-developed countries have until 2016 to comply with the TRIPS Agreement, which requires that
31
The
they provide patent, trademark, and copyright protection.
TRIPS agreement calls for WTO member states to grant patents for
any invention in all technological fields, which covers pharmaceutical
32
drugs. As the least-developed countries implement patent-law regimes, they may choose to allow parallel trade. For example, a draft
33
patent law in Bangladesh permits parallel trade. India’s revised pa34
tent law contains a liberal parallel-importing provision. And South
Africa, recognizing the potential cost-saving effects of parallel trade,
authorized the parallel importation of drugs under the Medicines
35
and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997.
28

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The TRIPS Agreement is a multilateral agreement on
intellectual property.
Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2010).
29
WORLD TRADE ORG., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
30
Id. para. 5(d); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, art. 6; Fact Sheet: TRIPS and
Pharmaceutical Patents, Obligations and Exceptions, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm#dohadecl
5d (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
31
Press Release, World Trade Org., Poorest Countries Given More Time to Apply
Intellectual
Property
Rules
(Nov.
29,
2005),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr424_e.htm.
32
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, arts. 27:1, 70:8.
33
WORLD BANK, BANGLADESH DEVELOPMENT SERIES PAPER NO. 23, PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTOR APPROACHES TO IMPROVING PHARMACEUTICAL QUALITY IN BANGLADESH
18
(2008),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTBANGLADESH/Resources/pharmaceutical.pdf.
34
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, section 58, Acts of Parliament,
2005
(India),
available
at
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/
patent_2005.pdf; Shamnad Basheer & Mrinalini Kochupillai, ‘Exhausting’ Patent
Rights in India: Parallel Imports and TRIPS Compliance, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS 486,
490 (2008).
35
See Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997 § 10
(S. Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=70836.
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Developing countries would not be alone if they chose to open
their markets to parallel trade. Europe has a parallel trade system for
pharmaceutical drugs that continues to grow in response to price differences for drugs between European countries. The Treaty Estab36
lishing the European Economic Community authorized the free
movement of goods between European member countries and thereby established a European parallel trade system based on regional
37
exhaustion. The EU has integrated new country members into the
existing parallel trade system. For example, Sweden allowed parallel
imports of pharmaceuticals when it joined the EU in 1995 so as to
38
comply with EU regulations. Parallel imports are now included as
acceptable drug substitutes under a generic substitution policy that
mandates Swedish physicians to prescribe the lowest-priced generic
39
substitute for a drug. Poland, which joined the EU in 2004, doubled
the number of drugs authorized for parallel importation in 2008;
40
sales of parallel imports increased eighty-nine percent in 2008. The
parallel trade system in the EU is established and growing, and it illustrates the use of parallel imports as a means of cutting health-care
costs.
This Comment will argue that the African Union (AU) should
consider a parallel trade system based on regional exhaustion as a
means of addressing the pharmaceutical drug crisis. Parallel trade is
not going away given its strong foundation in the EU and the flexibility available to developing countries in selecting intellectual property
right exhaustion doctrines under the TRIPS Agreement. Although
much focus is on the lack of affordable drugs in Africa as compared
to North America or Europe, drug prices also differ between African
countries. These price differentials are a motivation for parallel
trade. Such price differentials between African countries strengthen

36

Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
arts. 28–30, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
37
Under the doctrine of regional exhaustion, the intellectual property rights for
a patent cease upon the first sale of a product in a regional market. Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1432.
38
PIERRE MOÏSE & ELIZABETH DOCTEUR, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.
(OCED), OCED HEALTH WORKING PAPERS NO. 28, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AND
REIMBURSEMENT
POLICIES
IN
SWEDEN
38
(2007),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/17/40699881.pdf.
39
Id. at 22, 38.
40
IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, POLAND’S PARALLEL IMPORTS MARKET GROWS RAPIDLY IN
2008 (2009), available at http://www.globalinsight.com/SDA/SDADetail16048.htm.

BUCKLEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

4/12/2011 9:08 AM

COMMENT

631

the idea that the AU should explore a regional exhaustion system
modeled after the EU system.
Part II of this Comment will introduce the relevant principles of
parallel trade in the context of pharmaceutical drugs. It will review
the EU’s approach to parallel trade and focus on the applicable patent-law principles, the regulations that govern the EU system, case
41
law, and the benefits of and concerns about the system. Part III will
examine Africa’s current approach to free trade and intellectual
property rights and will review the current drug crisis in Africa. In
particular, this Comment will highlight South Africa’s experience
with the parallel trade of drugs. Part IV will argue that a parallel
trade system based on regional exhaustion has the potential to increase access to pharmaceutical drugs in the AU. This Part will review the motivations for implementing such a system in Africa and
discuss the required support structure, drawing on the EU’s experience.
II. KEY PRINCIPLES OF PARALLEL TRADE IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
CONTEXT: AN ILLUSTRATION IN THE EUROPEAN APPROACH
Parallel trade is the mechanism by which products protected by
intellectual property rights—from a patent, trademark, or copyright—are placed into circulation in one market and then exported
to a second market and sold without the authorization of the intellec42
tual property right holder. The consequence of parallel trade is that
a protected product is available from multiple sources: the right
43
holder and traders or dealers. The main motivation for parallel
44
trade is price differences between countries for goods. But the extent to which parallel trade is established in a country or region depends on the exhaustion doctrine that has been implemented by the
45
local or regional government. Because of the research-based, patent-protected nature of the pharmaceutical industry, parallel trade is
46
particularly relevant in the context of prescription drugs. Yet it is

41
This Comment does not focus extensively on economic principles. Instead,
this Comment will examine parallel trade primarily from the perspective of intellectual property law.
42
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 1. This Comment focuses on patents, specifically
of pharmaceutical drugs.
43
Id.; see Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20 (“[P]arallel imports play an
important role in preventing compartmentalisation of national markets.”).
44
EURACTIV, supra note 25.
45
Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1432.
46
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 6.
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precisely because the stakes are so high and because so many players
are involved in the pharmaceutical industry that parallel trade of
drugs is controversial. The current parallel trade system for drugs in
the EU illustrates the potential benefits of and issues surrounding this
trade mechanism.
A. Price Differences Between Countries Drive Parallel Trade Systems
Parallel trade is motivated by price differences between coun47
tries for similar products. A wholesaler in the country where the
product is available at a low price can make a profit by selling the
48
product in a country where it is currently sold at a higher price.
The main contributors to price differentials between countries include variations in intellectual property right protection, consumer
purchasing power, government price regulation, inflation, tax rates,
49
and marketing strategies. Thus, these factors indirectly fuel parallel
trade.
Many players operate within an economic market, and, as such,
parallel trade affects several parties. The obvious example is consumers, who benefit from lower-priced products, although the exact
50
amount of resultant savings to the consumer is uncertain. Another
group affected by parallel trade is the patent owners and local licensees. Patent right holders oppose parallel trade because they receive
51
direct benefits from exclusively importing their protected product.
Patent right holders often set the selling price and parallel trade un52
dermines the ability to control price by introducing competition.
Conversely, the presence of competition allows retailers, wholesalers,
53
and traders to make a profit on the sale of parallel imports. Finally,
governments play a role in parallel trade systems because they may set
price controls, which contribute to price differentials between coun54
tries. Parallel imports may result in savings for governments that,
55
for example, reimburse patient health-care costs. Additionally, gov47

Bart, supra note 20, at 997; EURACTIV, supra note 25.
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 6.
49
Id.
50
Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1430; EURACTIV, supra note 25; see
also Parallel Distributions in Medicines—FAQs, EUR. ASSOC. OF EURO-PHARMACEUTICAL
COS., http://www.eaepc.org/faq/index.php?n=6 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (noting
that another effect of parallel trade is the creation of additional jobs).
51
Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1431.
52
Id.
53
Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20.
54
Parallel Imports of Proprietary Medicinal Products, supra note 9, at 6.
55
Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1430.
48
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ernments may select or promote parallel trade as a public policy me56
chanism to ensure consumer access to certain goods, such as drugs.
As such, a variety of economic factors contribute to the price differences for goods between countries that drive parallel trade systems.
But it is local and regional governments, with the power to select an
exhaustion doctrine, that determine whether a functioning parallel
trade system is launched in the first place.
B. The Correlation Between the Selection of an Exhaustion Doctrine
and the Existence of a Parallel Trade System
The concept of exhaustion emerges at the crossroad of intellectual property rights and economics. Patents give inventors the rights
to exclude competitors from producing, selling, and distributing
their invention for a specified period of time, typically twenty years
57
from the filing date of the patent application. Accordingly, the legal
question regarding parallel trade is as follows: “To what extent should
countries allow or limit the ability of [intellectual property] right
holders within particular national/regional territories to control the
movement of products across different markets on the basis of local
58
ownership of [intellectual property] rights?” This question is answered in part by the exhaustion doctrine implemented by a country
or group of countries, which outlines the interaction between intellectual property rights and market forces.
The three types of exhaustion doctrines are national exhaustion,
regional exhaustion, and international exhaustion. Under national
exhaustion, the exclusive rights of a patent holder over his protected
product cease after the first sale of the product within national bor59
ders. Therefore, although patent holders cannot block sales within
the country, they can prevent parallel imports from outside the coun60
try’s borders. The second type of exhaustion is regional exhaustion.
Here, the exclusive rights of a patent holder end after the first sale of
61
the patented product in a regional market. The EU follows regional
exhaustion, which means that parallel imports are allowed between
62
member countries but are blocked from countries outside the EU.
The third type is international exhaustion, which is the exhaustion
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id.
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 1.
Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1432.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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doctrine with the widest scope. Under this approach, the patent
rights granted to an inventor cease after the first sale of the patented
63
product in any market in the world. India, Malaysia, Taiwan, Israel,
and Argentina are examples of countries that adopted international
64
exhaustion. In these countries, patent holders cannot prevent parallel imports from entering the local market by relying on intellec65
tual property rights alone.
No legally binding global agreement governs the exhaustion of
66
patent rights. Under the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration, WTO member countries can select the exhaustion doctrine that
67
This essentially
best fits their individual domestic policy goals.
means that parallel trade is a matter of national interest. A variety of
factors can impact the choice of exhaustion doctrine and, in the context of parallel trade of pharmaceutical drugs, may include the pres68
ence of a local or regional pharmaceutical industry.
C. Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents
and Profits
The pharmaceutical industry has been particularly susceptible to
parallel trade. Parallel trade is driven by price differences between
goods, and several internal and external characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry, ranging from strong patent rights over drugs to
government regulations, impact the price of drugs. First, the phar69
maceutical industry is an industry protected by patents, which means
pharmaceutical companies have the exclusive rights to make and sell
a patented drug. Governments grant patents in reward for the significant research and development efforts required to develop new
70
drugs. Pharmaceutical companies hope to recoup research costs

63

Id.
Bart, supra note 20, at 998.
65
Id.
66
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 4.
67
Doha Declaration, supra note 29, para. 5(d) (“The effect of the provisions in
the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights is to leave each Member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion
without challenge, subject to the MFN [most favored nation] and national treatment
provisions of Articles 3 and 4.”); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, art. 6 (“For the
purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of
Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”).
68
Bart, supra note 20, at 998.
69
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 6.
70
Id.
64
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71

from patented drug-sale profits. Second, the research-based nature
of the pharmaceutical industry results in a policy of active price discrimination on the part of pharmaceutical companies in an attempt
72
to earn revenue. Third, the pharmaceutical industry is a highly regulated industry and strict governmental drug-approval rules increase
73
research costs, which in turn raise drug prices. Finally, outside factors such as government-enforced price controls, exchange rates,
consumer demand, and different intellectual property regimes also
74
impact drug prices. The combination of internal and external influences on the pharmaceutical industry contributes to the varying
drug costs incurred by consumers.
The prevalence of parallel trade in the pharmaceutical industry
has generated arguments for and against allowing parallel imports of
drugs. Supporters point to the fact that in countries where drug costs
are high, parallel trade may help lower costs because parallel trade
increases the supply of drugs, and therefore, increases price competi75
tion. But opponents of parallel trade argue that pharmaceutical
companies will be less likely to invest in research and development
because their profits will decrease due to the existence of lower76
priced parallel imports. The exclusive right of a pharmaceutical
71

A. Bryan Baer, Note, Price Controls Through the Back Door: The Parallel Importation
of Pharmaceuticals, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 109, 126 (2001).
72
See generally id. at 127 (“[P]harmaceutical companies segment the world market
into discrete geographic regions adjusting price accordingly to maximize their recovery of capital.” This approach incentivizes the development of new products.);
Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20 (noting price discrimination by drug
manufacturers as a basis for parallel trade).
73
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 6.
74
Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1430; Baer, supra note 71, 126–27;
see also Panos Kanavos & Sotiris Vandoros, Competition in Prescription Drug Markets: Is
Parallel Trade the Answer?, 31 MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 325, 336 (2010) (finding
that drug prices are determined by regulation, the presence of generic drugs in the
market, and the number of competitors in the wholesale market).
75
See Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1430 (“By increasing the options for alternative supplies of products, parallel imports can allow consumers to
gain access to the products they need from another market at lower prices than are
being charged in their own market.”); Joan Costa-Font & Aaron Burakoff, Comment,
An Overview of Progress in the International Regulation of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1
PIERCE L. REV. 103, 106–07 (2002) (noting that parallel importing “increase[s] both
supply and price competition . . . .”); EURACTIV, supra note 25 (noting that parallel
imports may help cut pharmaceutical costs for governments).
76
See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consume Welfare, and Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 187 (1999) (characterizing the pharmaceutical
industry as a high-technology industry “where parallel imports will inhibit the ability
of firms to recoup R&D [(research and development)] and other fixed costs and ultimately reduce their ability to innovate.”); Costa-Font & Burakoff, supra note 75, at
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company to market a drug allows it to charge super-competitive prices to recover research-and-development expenses for drugs that went
77
to market and for unmarketable drugs. Without the market protection that stems from a patent, pharmaceutical companies would not
78
have an incentive to develop new drugs. In rebuttal, supporters of
parallel trade point to the lack of evidence that parallel trade has
79
caused pharmaceutical companies to cut back on research.
Supporters also argue that implementing a global international
exhaustion system—that is, a system in which all countries would
adopt the international exhaustion doctrine—would allow consumers
80
worldwide to take advantage of lower prices. Supporters say that international exhaustion of patent rights is consistent with the liberal
trade policy promoted by the WTO and that the WTO should favor
81
open trade over territorial-based restrictions that hinder free trade.
Opponents, however, respond that price discrimination is a good
82
thing. Besides noting that research and development requires that
pharmaceutical companies are able to sell their drugs at a profit,
those against parallel trade argue that price discrimination allows
companies to offer lower prices in some countries and higher prices
107 (“Since parallel trade erodes the price differences, it undermines the price mechanism that pays for research and development.”); EURACTIV, supra note 25 (“Big
pharmaceutical companies say that, as their profits decrease due to parallel imports,
they are obliged to invest less in R&D.”).
77
Baer, supra note 71, at 126.
78
Id.
79
See Donald Macarthur, Parallel Trading of Medicines: The Case for a Fair Deal, 11
CONSUMER POL’Y REV. 6, 9 (2001) (“Diversion of sales from one European country to
another has not led to the research-based industry cutting back on research and development. According to the manufacturers’ body, [European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations], spend on pharmaceutical R&D in Europe
grew more than three-fold from 1985 to 1999. There is no evidence that capital investment is affected either.”). For an argument that parallel trade may increase incentives for drug manufacturers to develop innovative drugs by reducing the attractiveness of drugs that imitate already existing drugs, see Alain Schlaepfer, Innovation,
Imitation and Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry 1–2 (Aug. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the 10th Annual European Trade Study Group
Conference,
2008),
available
at
http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2008/
Papers/Schlaepfer.pdf.
80
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 2.
81
Joan A. Harrelson, Note, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV / AIDS Crisis:
Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7 WIDENER
L. SYMP. J. 175, 195 (2001).
82
See ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 2–4 (reviewing a discussion that price discrimination promotes economic development through research while providing for low
priced essential medicines); Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 76, at 187.
(“[P]rice discrimination . . . will enhance welfare by facilitating entry into new, lowpriced markets and thus expanding output.”).
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83

in others. If a pharmaceutical company had to set only one price, it
84
would likely set a price higher than many people could afford. The
argument follows that a global system of international exhaustion
would actually raise prices for consumers in poor countries and shut
85
them out of access to affordable medicines.
In addition to the debate over drugs profits and pharmaceutical
research, other arguments against parallel trade are also common.
86
The amount of direct savings by consumers is uncertain. Additionally, safety is a concern because faulty repackaging of drugs places
87
consumers at risk. The risk that counterfeit drugs will replace im88
ported drugs is also a fear. Finally, opponents look to the integrity
of the patent-law system and note that restrictions on parallel trade
are a “normal competitive restraint” that is “consistent with the pur89
pose of patent protection.” But in the face of the arguments offered
83
See ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 2 (noting the argument that if a company
cannot price discriminate, it will only set one price, and that price would likely be
higher than many consumers would be willing to pay).
84
Id.
85
See id. (noting the argument that a global regime of international exhaustion
may hurt the welfare of individuals in poor countries because it would raise prices in
those markets higher than the average international price); David W. Opderbeck,
Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game, 58 VAND. L. REV. 501, 554 (2005)
(“The high demand elasticity in developing country markets makes R&D investment
too great a gamble for developed country manufacturers if the developed country
market cannot support monopoly prices.”); Alan O. Skyes, Public Health and International Law: TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 47, 64 (2002) (“When parallel imports are possible, by contrast, [pharmaceutical companies] will likely become unwilling to sell at low prices in markets
where demand is weak. Poorer countries may then find themselves largely priced
out of the market for particular medications.”); cf. Barfield & Groombridge, supra
note 76, at 260 (“[P]rice differentials of pharmaceuticals across markets often have
little to do with the pricing strategies of pharmaceutical firms; rather, it is based on
government intervention.”). Barfield and Groombridge stated this proposition in
support of the argument that parallel trade may do little to create the uniform market that supporters of international exhaustion desire. Id. at 260. Yet this point also
weakens the argument that price differentials are required to promote drug research
and development.
86
EURACTIV, supra note 25.
87
Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 76, at 260.
88
Bryan A. Liang, Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals: Injecting the Counterfeit Element
into Public Health, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 847, 852–53 (2006). The risk that
drugs with “fake, tainted, different, expired, concentrated, or diluted drug forms
and / or ineffective materials” could replace legitimate drugs en route to another
market is a concern. Id. at 852. The risk that counterfeits may mix with legitimate
drugs also exists; this is referred to as “salting.” Id. at 853.
89
Patricia M. Danzon, The Economics of Parallel Trade, 13 PHARMAECONOMICS 293,
301 (1998); see also Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 76, at 215 (arguing that patent protection is necessary to the pharmaceutical industry because other companies
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by opponents of parallel trade, parallel trade has managed to take
hold in the pharmaceutical industry and is most firmly established in
the EU.
D. Strong Support for a Single Market and the Endurance of the
European Parallel Trade System for Pharmaceutical Drugs
Parallel trade has a strong foundation in the EU. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) permitted parallel trade in Europe. Articles 28 and 30 of the EEC Treaty
prohibit national laws that restrict the free flow of goods between
90
member countries, and Article 81 prohibits agreements that attempt
to restrict the common market with limitations, such as restrictions
91
on production and development. The EU’s desire for a single mar92
ket facilitated the implementation and acceptance of parallel trade.
Parallel trade contributes to the development of such a market by allowing products sold at different prices to move between the national
markets of EU members and thereby increasing the availability of
93
products to the consumer.
The free movement of goods in the EU means that no member
country can place legal, legislative, or other barriers between the

or individuals can easily copy drug compounds). Economists find that, especially in
the pharmaceutical industry, “the symbiotic relationship between property rights
granted through patents and the simultaneous increment to the nation’s ‘knowledge
base’ through publication of the patent, contributes strongly to technological advancement and higher economic growth.” Id. at 259.
90
EEC Treaty, supra note 36, arts. 28, 30. Article 28 of the EEC Treaty prohibits
“quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect.” Id.
art. 28. Article 30 of the EEC Treaty recognizes that restrictions may be necessary in
some cases as long as the restrictions do not constitute arbitrary discrimination or
disguised restrictions on trade between member countries. Id. art. 30.
91
Id. art. 81. Article 81 of the EEC Treaty forbids “all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market . . . .”
Id.
92
See, e.g., Case C-44/01, Pippig Augenoptik v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft,
2003 E.C.R. I-3095, 1 C.M.L.R. 39, 1278 (2004) (“[I]n completing the internal market as an area without internal frontiers in which free competition is to be ensured,
parallel imports play an important role in preventing the compartmentalisation of
national markets.”).
93
Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20; see also Commission Communication
on the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals, at 1, COM (1998) 588 final (Nov. 25, 1998)
(“The purpose of the completion of the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals is not just
to provide an environment which is favorable for pharmaceutical innovation and industrial development, it is also to improve consumer choices in pharmaceuticals of
the required quality, safety and efficacy, at an affordable cost.”).
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94

trading members. In accordance with this approach, the EU follows
95
the doctrine of regional exhaustion. This means that within the EU,
parallel trade is not restricted between member countries absent a
96
private contract provision. In some cases, a member country can
stop or restrict parallel imports if the country shows that restrictive
measures are necessary to protect human health and life or to protect
97
industrial and commercial property. Parallel imports from countries outside the EU follow the intellectual property laws of the territories from which they originated, and consequently, right holders in
European member countries can ban parallel imports from outside
98
the EU based on the principles of regional exhaustion.
A review of the pharmaceutical parallel-import process in the EU
provides insight into the mechanics of parallel trade. First, the parallel importer chooses an EU source country where the product is sold
99
at a lower price than in another EU country. The trader purchases
the product from a retail vendor in the low-price country who originally purchased the drug directly from the manufacturer or a li100
censed reseller. The parallel importer then repackages the product
so the drug is labeled and contains instructions in the language of the
101
To ensure that no alteration of the drug ocreceiving country.
curred during the repackaging process, the importer must identify
who repackaged and manufactured the product, the repackaging
must not damage the reputation of the trademark or its owner, and
the trademark owner must receive notice before the repackaged
102
product goes on sale.
A parallel trader must obtain a Parallel Im94

Liang, supra note 88, at 852.
Bart, supra note 20, at 998.
96
Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 76, at 199.
97
Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20.
98
Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int’l Schmied v. Harlauer Handelsgesellschaft, 1998
E.C.R. I-4799, 2 C.M.L.R. 953 (1998). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Silhouette held that a European Commission directive on trademarks only implemented
an intra-community exhaustion rule: “[T]he Directive cannot be interpreted as leaving it open to the Member States to provide in their domestic law for exhaustion of
the rights conferred by a trade mark in respect of products put on the market in
non-member countries.” Id. at 977. This means that EU countries “are required to
uphold the right of trademark owners to restrict parallel imports” from outside the
EU. Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 76, at 199. The case is assumed to apply to
patents as well. Id. at 200; see also Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1432
(noting that an implication of regional exhaustion is the ability of right holders to
ban parallel imports from outside the region).
99
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 8.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20.
95
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port Product License issued by a national agency or the European
103
Medicines Agency. Prior to placing the imported drug on the market, the trader must demonstrate that the imported drug is identical
104
to the drug currently available on the importing country’s market.
“Sufficiently similar” products—drugs “manufactured according to
the same formulation, [use] the same active ingredients, and . . . have
105
the same therapeutic effects”—are acceptable. The policies behind
the EU parallel trade system aim to further the goal of improving the
106
quality, safety, and efficacy of health care for EU citizens.
Parallel trade is attractive in Europe because the governments of
EU member countries fix drug prices—drug prices are not controlled
107
by free competition laws, as they are in the United States. EU countries with socialized medicine favor parallel trade as a way to obtain
108
cheaper drugs and reduce government health-care spending.
European case law reflects this preference, as cases starting from the
1970s onward have upheld the concept of regional exhaustion and
109
have given priority to free trade throughout Europe.
Notably, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that a pharmaceutical company
103

ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 10. In accordance with the concept of the free
movement of goods, the European Medicines Agency has recently made parallel
trade of pharmaceutical drugs in the EU easier by permitting a drug to go through a
single registration process for safety, efficacy, and labeling review. Lana Kraus, Note,
Medication Misadventures: The Interaction of International Reference Pricing and Parallel
Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 527, 545 (2004). Once
approved, the drug may be placed on the market in all European countries with
standardized labeling and dosage. Id. at 545.
104
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 8.
105
Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20.
106
Commission Communication on the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals, supra note 93,
at 1–2.
107
EURACTIV, supra note 25.
108
Julia A. Moore, Parallel Trade, Unparallel Laws: An Examination of the Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade Law of the United States, the European Union and the World Trade Organization, 6 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 77, 83 (2006); cf. Kanavos & Vandoros, supra note
74, at 336 (finding that parallel trade does not lead to price competition and characterizing the effect of parallel trade on the pharmaceutical budgets of European
countries as “at best ambiguous”).
109
See Case 15/74, Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147, 2
C.M.L.R. 480 (1974). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Centrafarm gave priority to free trade by holding that once a patent holder places a product on the market
or consents to placing the product on the market, then his intellectual property
rights are exhausted and such rights cannot prevent parallel imports. Id. at 503–04;
see also Case 104/75, Officier van Justitie v. De Peijper, 1976 E.C.R. 613, 2 C.M.L.R.
271 (1976). In De Peijper, the ECJ held that consumers can import cheaper drugs
from a pharmacy in another member country if the drug was for sale in the consumer’s own country and interpreted Articles 30 to 36 (now Article 28 and 30) of the
EEC Treaty as establishing the legality of parallel imports. 2 C.M.L.R. at 303–06.
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exhausted its patent rights even if the company placed its product on
the market in a country that did not offer patent protection for
pharmaceutical drugs, as long as the company consented to placing
110
its drug on that market. In an unusual move in 2004, however, the
ECJ in Bundesverband der Arneimittel-Importeure eV v. Bayer AG reversed
the European Commission’s decision that Bayer violated Article 81 of
the EEC Treaty when Bayer penalized wholesalers in Spain and
France with excise duties for exporting a drug to the United King111
dom, where it was forty percent more expensive. Article 81 prohibits agreements that attempt to restrict the common European mar112
ket.
But in Bayer, the ECJ held that Bayer could independently
113
restrict parallel trade of its products.
Despite this holding, which
appears to curb parallel trade, the European Commission has distinguished Bayer as concerning “competition issues (private sector practices regarding supplies) and does not alter the [ECJ’s] case law on
free movement of goods or state measures regarding parallel im114
ports.” The relatively consistent commitment to the free movement

110

Case 187/80, Merck & Co. Inc. v. Stephar B.V., 1981 E.C.R. 2063, 3 C.M.L.R.
463 (1981). Merck sold its drug in Italy, where, at the time, there were no patent
protections for pharmaceutical drugs and prices were low. Id. at 467–68. Stephar
imported the drug from Italy into the Netherlands. Id. The ECJ held that since
Merck consented to putting its drug on the Italian market, it exhausted its patent
rights, despite the absence of Italian patent protection. Id. at 471–72; see also Case C267/95, Merck & Co. Inc. v. Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-6285, 1 C.M.L.R. 83
(1997). The ECJ in Primecrown affirmed the principles in Stephar—namely, that the
patentee consented to market the product in Spain and Portugal (where there were
no pharmaceutical patent rights at the time) and, therefore, its rights were exhausted and traders could import the products into the United Kingdom. 1
C.M.L.R. at 172–74, 176; cf. Case 19/84, Pharmon B.V. v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R.
2281, 3 C.M.L.R. 775 (1985). In Pharmon, the issue was whether the ECJ should apply the exhaustion principle to drugs sold under a compulsory license. 3 C.M.L.R. at
781; see infra Part III.C (defining compulsory licensing). According to the ECJ, the
patent rights were not exhausted because the patentee did not consent to the compulsory license. 3 C.M.L.R. at 791.
111
Case C-2/01, 2004 E.C.R. I-23. 4 C.M.L.R. 692, 698 (2004). Article 81 was previously Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. 4 C.M.L.R. at 693.
112
EEC Treaty, supra note 36, art. 81.
113
Bayer, 4 C.M.L.R. at 713–14 (“The mere fact that the unilateral policy of quotas
implemented by Bayer . . . produces the same effect as an export ban does not mean
either that the manufacturer imposed such a ban or that there was an agreement
prohibited by Art. 85(1) of the Treaty.”); id. at 718 (“[T]he mere fact that there is a
hindrance to parallel imports is not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an
agreement prohibited by Art. 85(1) of the Treaty.”).
114
Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 20. For an argument that the Bayer
decision weakens the EU’s economic solidarity and cohesiveness and that because
the EU favors parallel trade, authorities will continue to encourage parallel trade, see
generally Luke W. Reynolds, Note & Comment, ECJ in Bayer Allows Pharmaceutical
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of goods by the ECJ likely correlates to the enduring EU parallel
115
trade system.
Empirical data shows that parallel imports account for a significant portion of the pharmaceutical markets in EU countries. Denmark and Sweden lead the way, with parallel imports making up
15.2% and 13.9%, respectively, of their pharmaceutical markets in
116
2007. In Germany, the market share of re-imported drugs was 5.8%
117
118
The increase is likely bein 2002 and it reached 8.9% in 2007.
cause of the continued effect of a 2001 German law that makes it
mandatory for pharmacists to supply low-priced alternative drugs,
119
namely, generics or parallel imports, when possible. An estimated
120
90% of pharmacists supply parallel imports in the United Kingdom.
In 2007, parallel imports made up 12.4% of the United Kingdom
121
market. Parallel trade in the EU is expected to gradually increase
122
as a result of the enlargement of the EU in 2004.

Companies to Increase Profits by Breaking Down European Union Cohesion—With Just One
Pill, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 379 (2006).
115
As evidence of its continued commitment to promoting single EU market, the
ECJ recently reiterated that agreements between producers and distributors defined
in terms of national divisions in trade between member states may violate the EEC
Treaty’s goal of achieving a single market. Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C515/06 P and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission, 2009
ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1330, ¶ 61 (3d Chamber Oct. 6, 2009). Evidence that consumers have been deprived of the benefits of effective competition in terms of supply or
price is not required to find that an agreement is anti-competitive, as Article 81 of
the treaty protects the overall structure of the market and not just the interests of
competitors or consumers. Id. at ¶ 63. As such, an agreement between a drug manufacturer and Spanish wholesalers that distinguished between prices charged for
domestic retail and prices charged for drug exports to other EU countries violated
Article 81. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 66–67.
116
EUR. FED’N OF PHARM. INDUS. & ASS’NS, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN
FIGURES,
KEY
DATA,
2009
UPDATE
3
(2009),
available
at
http://www.interfarma.org.br/site2/images/Site%20Interfarma/Informacoesdoseto
r/Publicacoes/EFPIA2009.pdf [hereinafter EFPIA].
117
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 11–12.
118
EFPIA, supra note 116, at 3.
119
ARFWEDSON, supra note 42, at 11.
120
Id. at 13.
121
EFPIA, supra note 116, at 3.
122
EURACTIV, supra note 25. For example, Romania, which ascended to the EU in
2007, has become a “hotspot” for exporting drugs to other EU countries via parallel
trade. Parallel Trade Continues to Drive Pharma Exports, BUS. MONITOR ONLINE (May 11,
2010),
http://www.allbusiness.com/pharmaceuticals-biotechnology/
pharmaceuticals-industry/14431230-1.html. Applications to the European Medicines
Agency for parallel trade licenses for drugs originating in Romania jumped from 11
in 2007 to 191 in 2009. Id. Membership in the EU is largely attributed as the driving
force behind Romania’s growing pharmaceutical export industry, as “improved trade
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Despite the establishment of parallel trade in the EU and its
continued growth, criticisms of the system persist and mirror the
123
Opposing pageneral concerns of parallel trade described above.
rallel trade, the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry alleges that it caused a £1.3 billion loss in sales revenue for the United
124
Kingdom–based pharmaceutical industry in 2005.
The European
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations agrees that
the desire to create a single market for pharmaceuticals is contributing to significant losses for the research-driven pharmaceutical industry and believes that importers, not patients, are receiving benefits to
125
the detriment of the intellectual property system. Additionally, critics question whether parallel trade has really promoted a single market because differences between European national markets still ex126
ist.
Instead of facilitating a common market, parallel trade may
highlight competing goals of the EU—namely, the ability of each
member country to set its own drug prices versus the principle of free
trade that allows traders to profit at the expense of pharmaceutical
127
companies.
In addition, pharmaceutical companies may be responding to reduced profits by setting a uniform price that is higher
than most consumers are willing to pay. For example, in 2003, Roche
announced that it was setting a European drug price of fifty-two euros
per day for its new AIDS drug, an amount higher than other AIDS
drugs, which may symbolize an attempt to stop parallel trade from
128
inhibiting research cost recovery.
Finally, the complexities of the
European supply chain may create opportunities for counterfeit

conditions inherent in EU membership meant there was greater potential for sales of
Romanian products abroad.” Id.
123
See supra Part II.C (describing the arguments against parallel trade).
124
EURACTIV, supra note 25.
125
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 10; EURACTIV, supra note 25; see also Danzon, supra note 89, at 303–04 (“[I]f the free movement of goods is defined to permit parallel trade, this undermines the ability of pharmaceutical companies to maintain price
differentials between countries. This reduces revenues which in turn has adverse
long run effects on the level of R&D, particularly R&D investments in the EU . . . .”).
126
Commission Communication on the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals, supra note 93,
at 3 (“The continued differences between European markets lead to excess costs
(such as higher marketing costs, higher distribution and administrative costs) and, in
some cases, to excess production capacity, that could be off-set by a better operating
(single) market.”). But cf. Moore, supra note 108, at 82 (“In the EU, the drive towards the single market outweighs the negative effects of parallel trade within the
Community.”).
127
Costa-Font & Burakoff, supra note 75, at 107.
128
Kraus, supra note 103, at 550.

BUCKLEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/12/2011 9:08 AM

644

[Vol. 41:625

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
129

pharmaceutical drugs to enter into the market, another common
argument offered by those who oppose parallel trade.
Supporters of the EU parallel trade system do exist. For example, the European Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies
notes reduced consumer spending as a result of parallel trade and also points to the benefits of competition and free movement of medi130
cines. This association also questions whether parallel imports really hurt drug companies’ sales volume, given that parallel imports are
131
still the original products produced by the industry. Such support,
coupled with the priority given to parallel trade by EU entities like
the European Commission and the ECJ, suggests that the EU parallel
trade system will continue to grow. Countries looking to adopt parallel trade would be well served by reviewing the EU’s experience in establishing and maintaining parallel trade on a regional basis.
III. THE PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS AND THE DESIRE FOR A SINGLE
MARKET: A DISCUSSION OF PARALLEL TRADE IN THE AFRICAN UNION
The urgency of the public health crisis in the AU demands a
thorough evaluation of the roles of intellectual property law and economics in addressing the crisis. Understanding the magnitude of the
drug problem in the AU and the current state of African intellectual
property regimes will provide a foundation from which to develop
and refine solutions to improve access to affordable drugs. Importantly, the long-term vision of the AU—namely, to create a single
132
African market —must be considered in order to ensure that any solutions proffered accord with the goals and functions of the AU governing entities. Finally, a review of previous attempts to address the
African public health crisis by international bodies, African countries,
and other organizations highlights the ongoing search to find the optimal balance between intellectual property rights, market forces, and
health care. Notably, parallel trade has been considered a means of
increasing the availability of affordable drugs and has been adopted
in South Africa. Parallel trade is relevant because the public health
crisis in the AU creates strong motives to incorporate intellectual
129
See Liang, supra note 88, at 854–56. Drugs may change hands more than twenty times before reaching their final destination. Id. A drug is manufactured in one
country, shipped to the country with the intended market, sold by wholesalers in that
country, and then moved to a more expensive market. Id. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that counterfeit drugs comprise eight to ten percent of the
European pharmaceutical market. Id.
130
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 10; EURACTIV, supra note 25.
131
EURACTIV, supra note 25.
132
See infra Part III.B (describing the AU’s goal of a common market).
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property rights with the AU’s goal of a common market in order to
increase access to drugs.
A. Persistent Limited Access to HIV/AIDS Medication in Africa
Despite Limited Patent Protection
The HIV/AIDS crisis and lack of affordable antiretroviral treatments in Africa is well documented. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to
133
be the epicenter of the AIDS epidemic. More than two out of three
adults and nearly 90% of children living in the region are infected
with HIV, resulting in a total of 22.5 million people living with HIV in
134
Sub-Saharan Africa. Almost three out of four AIDS deaths globally
135
Approximately 17% of people in
occurred in the region in 2007.
136
sub-Saharan Africa received HIV/AIDS medications in 2005. South
Africans account for 25% of those receiving antiretroviral treat137
ment. Countries like Botswana and Uganda have drug coverage of
up to 50%, while the percentage of people receiving medication in
138
other African countries remains below 10%. Although the price of
first line HIV/AIDS treatment has dropped, the price of second-line
treatments remains very high, with significant price differences be139
tween African countries.
Although the devastating effects of the drug crisis in Africa on
HIV/AIDS patients are obvious, the exact reason why essential drugs
are so inaccessible is not as readily evident. Patents, however, are not
the main barrier preventing access to HIV/AIDS treatment in Africa.
Although drugs may be patented in Africa under national patent law
or through regional intellectual property groups, many antiretroviral
140
drugs are not patented in Africa. Despite this fact, the price for the
141
drugs remains “unacceptably high” in some countries, which weakens the argument that patents are the reason for lack of access to
133

JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV / AIDS &WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE 4 (Dec. 2007), available at http://data.unaids.org/
pub/EPISlides/2007/2007_epiupdate_en.pdf.
134
Id. at 7.
135
Id.
136
WORLD HEALTH ORG., PROGRESS ON GLOBAL ACCESS TO HIV ANTIRETROVIRAL
THERAPY: A REPORT ON “3 BY 5” AND BEYOND 7 (March 2006), available at
http://www.who.int/hiv/fullreport_en_highres.pdf.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 29–30.
140
Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain
Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa? 286 JAMA 1886, 1889 (2001).
141
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 136, at 29.
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drugs. Other factors besides the exclusive rights granted by patents
are likely responsible, such as the high cost of treatments, poverty,
national regulatory requirements for medicines, tariffs and sales tax,
142
and insufficient international aid.
Furthermore, whether patent
protection in Africa is truly an incentive for pharmaceutical companies to develop and provide drugs for African consumers is debata143
ble.
Given the variety of factors suggested as contributors to the
drug crisis, a deeper look at the current market situation and intellectual property law in the AU is worthwhile.
B. Intellectual Property in the African Union Reflects the Goal of a
Single Market
Unlike the EU, with its established parallel trade system, countries that make up the AU are still in the infant stages of working to144
wards a single market.
But recent activities within the AU reflect
the goal of building a common market. In 2002, to promote peace,
security, and stability, the AU succeeded the Organization for African
145
Unity.
The AU Constitution incorporates the Treaty Establishing
the African Economic Community (Treaty of Abuja) which envisions
146
a common African market. The Treaty of Abuja calls for the creation and expansion of regional economic communities (RECs) to
promote and strengthen trade between groups of African countries,
with the goal of integrating the RECs into a single market based on
147
free trade by 2023. The AU Commission functions as the day-to-day
manager of the AU and “elaborates, promotes, coordinates and har142

Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 140, at 1886, 1890–91.
Id. at 1890 (“[I]t is doubtful that pharmaceutical research and development
will always require the incentive of patentability in poor countries, since the option
to patent antiretroviral drugs in African has frequently gone unexercised.”); see also
Opderbeck, supra note 85, at 554 (“[N]o matter what level of patent protection is afforded in developing countries, it is unlikely that developed country manufacturers
will devote significant R&D resources to such [essential medicine] vaccines or treatments.”).
144
The AU consists of fifty-three member states; the only African state not in the
AU is Morocco. Member States, AFRICAN UNION, http://www.africa-union.org/
root/au/memberstates/map.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
145
African Union in a Nutshell, AFRICAN UNION, http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/AboutAu/au_in_a_nutshell_en.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
146
Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community art. 6, June 3, 1991,
available
at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/
AEC_Treaty_1991.pdf [hereinafter Treaty of Abuja].
147
Id. Examples of RECs include the East African Community and the Economic
Community of West African States. EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, http://www.eac.int/
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010); ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES,
http://www.ecowas.int/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
143
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monizes the programmes and policies of the Union with those of the
148
RECs.” Unlike the European Commission, which has the power to
draft new laws and implement the policies of the European Parlia149
ment and the European Council, the AU Commission has no pow150
ers of its own. Challenges to African integration and achievement
of a common market include lack of financial resources and political
151
But in
will, poor infrastructure, and inadequate trade facilitation.
spite of these challenges, it is important to recognize the AU’s desire
for a single market and to view intellectual property law in the AU
within that framework.
Most African countries have established patent regimes. For example, the earliest patent acts date in Rwanda to 1963, Liberia to
1972, Senegal to 1977, Democratic Republic of the Congo to 1982,
152
and Ethiopia to 1995.
Additionally, regional-based intellectual
property associations in Africa that are independent of the RECs aim
153
to unify intellectual property regimes within Africa. These associations are notable because they show a relative willingness by African
148
Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 20, July 11, 2000, available at
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm;
African
Union in a Nutshell, supra note 145.
149
EEC Treaty, supra note 36, art. 211 (“The Commission shall . . . have its own
power of decision and participate in the shaping of measures taken by the Council
and by the European Parliament in the manner provided for in this Treaty”); The Euhttp://europa.eu/institutions/inst/
ropean
Commission,
EUROPA,
comm/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
[The European Commission] drafts proposals for new European laws,
which it presents to the European Parliament and the Council. It is also the EU’s executive arm—in other words, it is responsible for implementing the decisions of Parliament and the Council. That means
managing the day-to-day business of the European Union: implementing its policies, running its programmes and spending its funds.
Id.
150
Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 148, art. 20(3) (“The structure, functions and regulations of the Commission shall be determined by the Assembly.”); Keith Gottschalk & Siegmar Schmidt, The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Strong Institutions for Weak States? 4 INTERNATIONALE
POLITIK UND GESELLSCHAFT [INT’L POL. & SOC’Y] 138, 141 (2004).
151
See Gottschalk & Schmidt, supra note 150, at 142; Dejo Olowu, Regional Integration, Development, and the African Union Agenda: Challenges, Gaps, and Opportunities, 13
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 235–43 (2003).
152
Least Developed Countries—Country Profiles, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/ldcs/en/country (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
153
See Africa Bureau—Cooperation and Partners, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/africa/en/partners_org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). The two
main regional intellectual property organizations in Africa are the African Regional
Intellectual Property Organization and the African Intellectual Property Organization. Id.
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countries to cooperate on a regional basis when it comes to traderelated issues.
Created in 1977, the African Intellectual Property Organization
(OAPI) covers Francophone Africa and is regulated by the Revised
154
Bangui Agreement.
The goals of the OAPI are to implement a
common procedure for granting intellectual property rights, to promote economic development by effective protection of such rights,
155
and to encourage creativity and technology transfer.
The Revised
Bangui Agreement serves as the national patent law for all OAPI
156
The World Health Organization and Doctors
member countries.
Without Borders voiced concern over the Revised Bangui Agree157
ment.
The organizations criticized the accord because it imposes
strict conditions on the use of compulsory licenses and does not ex158
plicitly allow parallel imports from non-OAPI member countries.
The agreement, characterized as “TRIPS Plus,” takes a stricter approach than the basic intellectual property protection requirements
159
set out in the TRIPS Agreement.

154

See Revised Bangui Agreement tit. 1, § 1, art. 2, Feb. 24, 1999, available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/details.jsp?group_id=21&treaty_id=
227 (select “Agreement Revising the Bangui Agreement of March 2, 1977, on the
Creation of an African Intellectual Property Organization”); African Intellectual Property Organization, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/africa/
en/partners_org/partners/oapi_bg.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
155
Revised Bangui Agreement, supra note 154, tit. 1, § 1, art. 2.
156
INT’L INTELL. PROP. INST., PATENT PROTECTION AND ACCESS TO HIV / AIDS
PHARMACEUTICALS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 39–41 (2000), available at
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/iipi_hiv.pdf; see Enyinna S. Nwauche,
A Development Oriented Intellectual Property Regime for Africa at Part V.I(a)
(2005) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at 11th General Assembly of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research for Africa, 2005), available at
http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/nwauche.pdf (“[T]he OAPI states are closely
integrated and could be considered a common intellectual property market.”).
157
See Press Release, Médecins San Frontières, New Agreement on Patents for
Medicines in Francophone Africa Threatens Health of Populations (May 11, 2000),
available at http://doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=597&cat=pressrelease.
158
COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND
DEVELOPMENT
POLICY
161
(Sept.
2002),
available
at
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm;
World
Health Org., Fears Over New Regional Patent Agreement, ESSENTIAL DRUGS MONITOR, No.
28/29, at 35 (2000), available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/
pdf/s2248e/s2248e.pdf; Press Release, Médecins San Frontières, supra note 157; see
infra Part III.C (defining compulsory licensing).
159
See Susan K. Sell, The Quest for Global Governance in Intellectual Property and Public
Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 363, 385–86
(2004).
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Established in 1976 by the Agreement on the Creation of the
African Regional Intellectual Property Organization, the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO) covers English160
speaking Africa.
The sixteen member countries include Kenya,
161
Ghana, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
The goals of the ARIPO include
harmonizing and developing intellectual property laws, promoting
162
the exchange of ideas, and providing training.
Unlike the OAPI,
which provides substantive national patent law for its members
through the Revised Bangui Agreement, the ARIPO’s activities are
largely procedural. For example, under the Harare Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs, the ARIPO has the power to grant pa163
tents on behalf of member countries. But the laws of each ARIPO
member country determine the substantive rights stemming from the
164
patent.
Therefore, the ARIPO serves mainly as a facilitative body
165
that enables faster registration for intellectual property rights.
Information about African intellectual property law is difficult to
obtain for several reasons. Most African countries have a small intellectual property law profession, communication is difficult, and intellectual property is often seen as an imported commodity that is unaf166
fordable, as in the case of patented drugs.
Some countries, like
South Africa and Nigeria, have stronger intellectual property regimes
167
than others.
Finally, the OAPI and the ARIPO are underutilized
because of lack of confidence in patent protection or general indiffe168
rence. But national patent laws and the OAPI and the ARIPO are
160
Agreement on the Creation of the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization art. 1, Nov. 13, 2004, available at http://www.aripo.org (select “Downloads”; then choose “Laws & Protocols”; then view “The Lusaka Agreement on the
Creation of the Organization”).
161
Id.
162
Id. art. 3.
163
Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs Within the Framework of the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization § 1, Feb. 24, 2007, available at
http://www.aripo.org (select “Downloads”; then choose “Laws & Protocols”; then
view “The Harare Protocol on Patents, Utility Models, and Designs”).
164
Id. § 3(11) (“Provided it is maintained, a patent granted by the Office shall in
each designated State have the same effect as a patent registered, granted or otherwise having effect under the applicable national law.”); Nwauche, supra note 156, at
Part V.I(b).
165
Nwauche, supra note 156, at Part V.I(b).
166
Jeremy Phillips, Intellectual Property and Africa: The Agony and Entropy, 3 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. & PRAC. 205, 205 (2008).
167
Id.
168
Id. See Nwauche, supra note 156, at Part V.I(c), for an argument of the need
for one intellectual property organization in Africa to promote the AU’s goal of
creating a common African market.
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not the only sources of intellectual property within the AU. International bodies have attempted to shape intellectual property in developing countries and have consequently impacted AU countries, particularly in the context of public health.
C. The Compulsory Licensing Option Under the TRIPS Agreement and
the Doha Declaration: A Potential Means of Addressing the Drug
Crisis, but Not a Cure-All
Although the TRIPS Agreement is silent on parallel trade and
leaves the selection of an exhaustion doctrine up to each WTO
member country, the agreement offers compulsory licensing as
another way for developing countries to obtain patented drugs. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement allows for the use of patented subject matter by a government or authorized third party without the
permission of the patent right holder if certain requirements are
169
met. When a government grants a compulsory license, the patentee
can no longer exclude others from using the claimed patented sub170
ject matter. In the context of patented drugs, a compulsory license
means a government can produce and sell a patented drug without
171
the authorization of the pharmaceutical company.
Although the WTO introduced compulsory licensing as another
way of increasing access to patented goods, member countries recognized several limitations of the compulsory-license provision as pro172
vided in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.
First, Article 31(b)
says that a country seeking to use the compulsory-license mechanism
should obtain consent from the patent holder to use the patented
product, but countries can waive this requirement in national emer173
gencies.
The Doha Declaration expanded the scope of Article
174
31(b) by broadly defining the phrase “national emergency.”
Para169

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, art. 31. Under Article 31(b), governments or
authorized third parties seeking a compulsory license should make an effort to first
obtain consent from the patent right holder. Id. art. 31(b). Governments or authorized third parties may waive this requirement during a national emergency. Id. According to Article 31(f), governments or authorized third parties can only grant a
compulsory license for domestic use. Id. art. 31(f). As stated in Article 31(g), the
license is terminated when the circumstances that led to the compulsory license no
longer exist. Id. art. 31(g). Under Article 31(h), the entity granting the compulsory
license should pay the patent holder remuneration to compensate for suspension of
his patent rights. Id. art. 31(h).
170
Harrelson, supra note 81, at 176.
171
Id.
172
Opderbeck, supra note 85, at 511–12.
173
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, art. 31(b).
174
See Doha Declaration, supra note 29, para. 5(c).
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graph 5(c) of the declaration states that “[e]ach Member has the
right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or
175
other circumstances of extreme urgency.”
Second, the requirement in Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement that a member country
may only grant a compulsory license predominantly for domestic use
is problematic for many developing countries because, even if they
were to grant a compulsory license, they lack the manufacturing ca176
pability to produce pharmaceuticals domestically.
A resolution
passed on August 30, 2003 (the “August 30 Decision”) addresses this
issue and includes a waiver for Article 31(f) that allows developed
member countries to produce and export generic drugs to develop177
ing countries without manufacturing capabilities.
Despite the ability of developed countries to export generic
drugs to developing countries, only one developed country has
178
granted a compulsory license for this purpose so far.
In October
2007, Canada granted a compulsory license permitting a Canadian
pharmaceutical company to manufacture and export generic AIDS

175

Id.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 28, art. 31(f). Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration recognizes that because of the domestic use limitation in article 31(f) of
TRIPS, “WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.” Doha Declaration, supra note 29, para. 6; see
also Opderbeck, supra note 85, at 512 (“The Doha Ministerial also acknowledged that
the ‘domestic use’ limitation on compulsory licensing would limit the value of [the
national emergency exception] for many developing countries and LDCs [(leastdeveloped countries)] that do not have sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity.”). In regards to the Article 6 problem of the Doha Declaration, developing countries argued that the broad language of TRIPS meant that member countries could
grant compulsory licenses “for foreign suppliers to provide medicines in the domestic market” and that members could “grant compulsory licenses to supply foreign
markets.” Skyes, supra note 85, at 54–55 (citing Developing Countries Push for TRIPS to
Allow Cheaper Medicines, 19 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 7 (June 22, 2001)).
177
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540, 43 I.L.M. 509 (2004) (decision of Aug.
30, 2003). The August 30 Decision requires certification that the importing country
lacks domestic manufacturing capabilities, distinct labeling and packaging requirements, and limits remuneration only the exporting country. Id.; Opderbeck, supra
note 85, at 514; Alexandra G. Watson, Note, International Intellectual Property Rights: Do
TRIPS’ Flexibilities Permit Sufficient Access to Affordable HIV / AIDS Medicines in Developing
Countries? 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 143, 146–47 (2009).
178
Watson, supra note 177, at 147.
176
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drugs to Rwanda. The lackluster response to compulsory licensing
may stem from fears that developed countries will exert undue influ180
ence over developing countries that accept the exports.
Many developing countries fear sanctions and business repercussions as a re181
sult of issuing compulsory licenses.
Consequently, compulsory
licensing could be a valuable tool, but as evidenced by the controversies surrounding the WTO decisions and the lack of usage, compulsory licensing is not the cure-all to the problem of affordable drugs.
D. South Africa’s Controversial Enactment of Parallel Trade and EUStyle Regulation
South Africa is a microcosm of the public health crisis in the AU
and also a forerunner in addressing the drug problem. In 2007, approximately 5.7 million adults and children were living with
182
HIV/AIDS in South Africa.
Although the country has not consistently addressed health-care inequities stemming from the AIDS epi183
demic, South Africa took a significant step to address the lack of affordable medications in 1997. The South African government passed
the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act,
which explicitly authorizes parallel imports and compulsory licensing
184
to promote access to affordable drugs.
South Africa enacted the
179

Id.; Canada Issues Compulsory License for HIV / AIDS Drug Export to Rwanda, in First
Test of WTO Procedure, 11 BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG. 4 (2007), available at
http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridgesweekly/bridgesweekly11-32.pdf.
180
Watson, supra note 177, at 147.
181
Id. at 158–59.
182
WORLD HEALTH ORG., EPIDEMIOLOGICAL FACT SHEET ON HIV AND AIDS SOUTH
AFRICA
4
(Sept.
2008),
available
at
http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/
predefinedReports/EFS2008/full/EFS2008_ZA.pdf.
183
Hoosen Coovadia et al., The Health and Health System of South Africa: Historical
Roots of Current Public Health Challenges, 374 LANCET 817, 824 (2009).
184
Section 10 of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act
90 of 1997 called for the addition of Section 15C to the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act of 1965 and reads as follows:
The following section is hereby inserted in the principal Act [Medicines and Related Substances Control Act of 1965] after section 15B:
“Measures to ensure supply of more affordable medicines 15C. The
Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable
medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the
public and in particular may—(a) notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in the Patents Act 1978 (Act No. 57 of 1978) determine that the rights with regard to any medicine under a patent
granted in the Republic shall not extend to acts in respect of such medicine which has been put onto the market by the owner of the medicine or with his or her consent; (b) prescribe the conditions on which
any medicine which is identical in composition, meets the same quality
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doctrine of international exhaustion by permitting the importation of
a patented medicine into the country that the patent holder first
185
placed on sale outside of South Africa.
South Africa set guidelines for the introduction of parallel imports into the market that resemble the parallel-import requirements
186
under the regional exhaustion system in the EU.
The guidelines
require prior registration of the patented medicine in South Africa
187
and a trader must receive a permit from the Ministry of Health. After receiving an importing permit, the trader must register the drug
that it plans to import and provide information about the exporter
188
and the labeler.
The guidelines also require repackaging of the
drug using the name approved in South Africa and placement of the
189
The largest exwords “Parallel Imported Medicine” on the label.
190
porter of these drugs to South Africa is India, which illustrates the
global impact of parallel trade.
standard and is intended to have the same proprietary name as that of
another medicine already registered in the Republic but which is imported by a person other than the person who is the holder of the registration certificate of the medicine already registered and which originates from any site of manufacture of the original manufacturer as
approved by the council in the prescribed manner, may be imported;
(c) prescribe the registration procedure for as well as the use of the
medicine referred to in paragraph (b).
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997, supra note
35, § 10; see also Bart, supra note 20, at 998 (describing the enactment of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, which legalized parallel imports of expensive AIDS drugs); Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Note, Examining Global Access
to Essential Pharmaceuticals in the Face of Patent Protection Rights: The South African Example, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 137, 140–41 (2001) (summarizing the implementation
of and reaction to South Africa’s legalization of parallel imports).
185
Draft Regulations in Terms of Act 101 of 1965, as amended (2000) (S. Afr.),
available at
http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/regulations/2001/101draftregulations.pdf (“A medicine under patent in the Republic may be imported into and disposed of in the Republic if such medicine has been put onto the market outside the Republic by or
with the consent of the patent holder of the medicine in the Republic subject to the
provisions of the Act and these Regulations.”); see also YOLANDA TAYLER, BATTLING
HIV/AIDS: A DECISION MAKER’S GUIDE TO THE PROCUREMENT OF MEDICINES AND
RELATED SUPPLIES 117 (World Bank Publications 2004) (summarizing the guidelines
for parallel imports in South Africa under the rule of international exhaustion).
186
See supra Part II.D (describing the parallel trade process in the EU).
187
Guideline for Parallel Importation of Medicines in South Africa in GG25145 of
27 June 2003 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.info.gov.za/notices/
2003/25145/25145h.pdf.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit
on Patent Rights, 53 FLA. L. REV. 789, 814 (2001).
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South Africa’s implementation of international exhaustion was
not without controversy. Questioning the constitutionality of the
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, thirtynine pharmaceutical companies sued the South African govern191
ment. The United States also became involved in efforts to reverse
192
the law.
But in the face of public pressure, the pharmaceutical
193
companies dropped the lawsuit. South Africa is an example of an
African country that saw parallel trade as a viable means of increasing
access to affordable drugs and took the broadest approach possible—
international exhaustion.
E. Other Proposals for Solving Africa’s Drug Crisis: Attempts to Limit
Parallel Trade
In an attempt to solve the problem of affordable drugs, existing
proposals offered by outside organizations have addressed the role of
parallel trade. Many of these proposals look primarily to the relationship between developed and developing countries and, as a result,
view parallel trade as a harmful trade mechanism. Such proposals
advocate limiting parallel trade with an eye towards promoting the
pharmaceutical industry or licensing purchase rights on an international level. But a parallel trade system based on regional exhaustion
has not been completely overlooked, which illustrates the need to
further consider the feasibility of such a system.
The goal of the Developing Economies’ Fund for Essential New
Drugs (DEFEND) Proposal is to establish “a new international organization to purchase the license rights for designated areas and distribute the drugs at low cost with a required co-payment from local governments. Furthermore, governments would restrict parallel trade to
194
support desirable price discrimination.”
Supporters of the
DEFEND Proposal advocate separating the cost of giving consumers
access to drugs from incentives for pharmaceutical companies to im195
prove and research drugs. Supporters also look towards increased
assistance from developed countries as a major source of funding for
196
the project.
The International Intellectual Property Institute’s (IIPI) plan includes dividing national markets by ability to pay for pharmaceuticals,
191
192
193
194
195
196

Bart, supra note 20, at 998.
Dolmo, supra note 184, at 138.
Bart, supra note 20, at 998; Dolmo, supra note 184, at 138.
ARFWEDSON, supra note 10, at 22.
Id.
Id.
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adopting prices for pharmaceuticals based on ability to pay, and implementing a system of international subsidies to help poorer coun197
tries afford drugs. The IIPI’s plan focuses on global adoption of na198
tional exhaustion of IP rights.
According to the IIPI’s proposal,
rejecting international exhaustion protects pharmaceutical compa199
nies from the effects of parallel importing.
Developing countries,
200
however, have not been supportive of national exhaustion, likely
because it shuts out access to parallel imports. The balance between
the competing interests of developing countries and pharmaceutical
companies is a difficult one to strike because so many variables are
201
present.
Both the DEFEND Proposal and the plan advocated by the IIPI
aim to restrict parallel imports. But one scholar, Professor Keith
Maskus, notes that regional exhaustion regimes among poor coun202
tries may be a viable option to improve access to drugs.
Professor
Maskus suggests that the adoption of regional exhaustion by poorer
countries would increase the size of the market in which prices are
integrated, would allow low-income nations to avoid high prices for
low-volume products, and would reduce transportation costs typically
203
incurred with parallel trade on an international level. The expectation would fall on regional groups consisting of low-income countries
to ban parallel exports to high-income economies in order to keep
supply available locally and not undermine pricing in countries out204
side the region.
By outlining the potential benefits of a regional exhaustion system in developing countries and pointing to the need for selfimposed limits of such a system, Professor Maskus’s proposal shows
the value of considering all sides of parallel trade. Instead of looking

197

Harrelson, supra note 81, at 197–98.
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 103, at 552 (“The ideal solution would integrate
three objectives: (1) allow for the promotion of pharmaceutical R&D, (2) create incentives for pharmaceutical companies to provide essential medicines to underdeveloped countries at an affordable cost (encourage differential pricing), and (3) promote principles of free trade.”).
202
KEITH E. MASKUS, PARALLEL IMPORTS IN PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
COMPETITION AND PRICES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, FINAL REPORT TO THE WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION 3 (2001), available at http://www.wipo.int/
export/sites/www/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/ssa_maskus_pi.pdf.
203
Id. at 43.
204
Id.
198
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to shut out parallel trade, the growing prominence of this trade mechanism should be acknowledged. This approach is critical in light
of the AU’s desire for a common market and the establishment of parallel trade in South Africa to lower drug costs. Regional exhaustion
in the AU has the potential to serve as an effective means for increasing access to affordable drugs while complementing the AU’s goal of
a common market and addressing the evolving presence of parallel
trade.
IV. REGIONAL EXHAUSTION IN THE AFRICAN UNION: ANOTHER TOOL
IN THE FIGHT FOR AFFORDABLE MEDICATIONS
In light of the EU’s success with regional exhaustion and the urgent need for medications, the AU should consider a regional parallel trade system to supplement other measures, such as compulsory
licensing, and increase the availability of affordable drugs. The impetus to adopt regional exhaustion is strong in the AU. African countries have a basic need for essential medicines at an affordable cost
that is aggravated by extreme price differences between AU coun205
tries.
Recent activities by African countries demonstrate the willpower necessary to obtain affordable drugs and improve cohesion
across the continent. For example, developing countries put up a
strong fight with regard to expanding the scope of the compulsory
licensing measures in the TRIPS Agreement to cover public health
206
crises.
Furthermore, regional intellectual property organizations
207
reflect the AU’s goal of a common market. South Africa turned to
parallel trade in an attempt to make pharmaceutical drugs more affordable for its citizens and has reached out to countries like India to
208
fulfill that goal. Instead of looking outward, a parallel trade system
built on regional exhaustion should be considered a viable means of
bringing affordable drugs to Africa.
As with any proposal, both the intended and unintended consequences must be considered. To date, the parallel trade discussion
has focused on the battle over pharmaceutical companies’ profits and
patent protection while pitting developed countries against developing countries. Despite continued debate over the exact impact of pa205
See infra Part IV.A (explaining findings of significant variations in prices for
similar drugs in AU countries).
206
See supra Part III.C (describing the evolution of the compulsory licensing
measure in the TRIPS Agreement).
207
See supra Part III.B (noting the AU’s desire for a single market).
208
See supra Part III.D (summarizing South Africa’s experience with parallel
trade).
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rallel trade on the research-driven pharmaceutical industry and questions about consumer savings, parallel trade of drugs does not show
signs of stopping and simply cannot be dismissed any longer. Furthermore, the impact of any proposed solution to the drug crisis, including parallel trade, on the relationship between developed and
developing countries should be acknowledged from the outset.
Meaningful limits on regional parallel trade should be implemented
to ensure that parallel imports reach the intended consumers in the
AU and that developing AU countries do not have to fear repercussions from developed countries. By addressing potential consequences, the benefits of a regional parallel trade system can be fully
appreciated. A parallel trade system based on regional exhaustion
would provide the AU with another tool in the fight to bring affordable drugs to patients.
A. Drug Price Differentials Between African Union Countries and the
Desire for a Common Market as Motivators for the Adoption of
Regional Exhaustion
The choice of exhaustion doctrine is a sovereign decision and
209
presents an opportunity to promote national or regional interests.
South Africa implemented international exhaustion in 1997, and the
move caused immediate outcry from pharmaceutical companies and
210
the United States. In light of the controversy over international ex211
haustion, adoption of an international exhaustion system across AU
countries is unlikely to be politically feasible. But other factors—
namely, price differentials between AU countries, the desire for a
common market, and improved distribution—favor the enactment of
a parallel trade system based on regional exhaustion in the AU.
First, the main driving factor for parallel trade is price differenc212
es between countries for similar products, and the AU meets this
prong of the test. Drug prices differ significantly between countries
in the AU—not just between developed and developing countries
globally. The extreme range of drug prices in Africa is evident from a
recent empirical study: retail prices for the drug ciprofloxacin, which
treats bacterial infections, ranged from $197 to $740; for metformin,
209
See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (explaining the WTO’s open
stance on the principle of exhaustion).
210
See supra Part III.D (describing the controversy surrounding South Africa’s
enactment of parallel trade).
211
See supra Part II.C (noting the arguments for and against adopting international exhaustion).
212
Bart, supra note 20, at 997.
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213

a drug used for treatment of diabetes, prices ranged from $5 to $50.
The ratio of lowest to highest retail prices between African countries
214
spread from 1:1.1 to 1:10.
Notably, the ratio for drug prices between OCED countries, which includes several European countries
that are key parallel importers, such as Denmark, Germany, and the
215
United Kingdom, ranged from only 1:1.6 to 1:3.6.
A recent study
noted that even though the public sector may provide medicines at a
reduced cost, such medicines are not consistently available and patients must still buy drugs in the private sector where they are often
216
unaffordable.
For example, the mark-up of drug prices, which
measures the difference between the manufacturer’s selling price
and the final price charged to patients after add-on costs such as taxes, varied from 56% in Tanzania to 358% in Uganda in the private
217
sector.
Similarly, prices for the same drug differed by 124% be218
Compared to African countries, the
tween Ethiopia and Uganda.
price differences between drugs in European countries is relatively
small, yet parallel trade is still viewed in the EU as an effective means
of reducing drug costs. The variation in prices is even greater between AU countries and the need to provide affordable drugs is even
more urgent. The main motivation for parallel trade via regional exhaustion—price differences between localized countries—is present
between AU member states.
Second, like the EU, the ultimate goal of the AU is to achieve a
single African market based on free-trade principles. The EU turned
to regional exhaustion as a means of achieving a common market;
regional exhaustion has the potential to facilitate a common market
in the AU as well. Importantly, the high degree of homogeneity
among European member states is a large reason for the successful
219
integration of the EU as a political and economic unit. Therefore,
213

K. Bala and Kiran Sagoo, Patents and Prices, HAI NEWS (Health Action Int’l,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands), Apr./May 2000, at tbl.7, available at
http://www.haiweb.org/pubs/hainews/Patents%20and%20Prices.html.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
A. Cameron et al., Medicine Prices, Availability, and Affordability in 36 Developing
and Middle-Income Countries: A Secondary Analysis, 373 LANCET 240, 245 (2009). The
same study found that the availability of generic drugs, which are typically lower
priced than branded drugs, varies widely within Africa, ranging from 14.8% availability in Chad to 79.1% in Ethiopia. Id. at 244.
217
Id. at 245.
218
MYHR, supra note 24, at tbl.9.
219
Yi Feng and Gaspare M. Genna, Regional Integration and Domestic Institutional
Homogeneity: A Comparative Analysis of Regional Integration in the Americas, Pacific Asia
and Western Europe, 10 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 278, 298 (2003).
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even in the face of the ECJ decision in Bayer that could have poten220
tially caused cracks in the European parallel trade system, cohesion
and commitment to a common market remains strong in the EU.
Likewise, to successfully implement a regional parallel trade system in the AU, strong cohesion between AU member countries is required. Under Article 73 of the Treaty of Abuja, members agree to
promote and increase cooperation in the field of health as part of the
221
goal of achieving a common economic market.
Although the AU
strives for a unified African continent, substantial political, cultural,
and economic differences exist between countries. But the activities
of the African RECs offer hope for sustained regional economic cooperation. For example, the Economic Community of the West African States, consisting of fifteen states, including Ghana, Nigeria, and
222
Senegal, has taken steps to promote free trade in its area. This REC
has prioritized health policy by creating the West African Health Organization to encourage health research, increase drug manufactur223
ing, and establish quality controls.
The RECs would be a good
place to initially implement regional exhaustion and parallel trade
because they are already established and participating in shared economic activities. It will be easier to surmount any cultural or political
differences when working with a group of countries that already interact on a regular basis and are committed to regional organization.
Other reasons exist for selecting regional exhaustion and encouraging parallel trade between AU member states. As noted by
Professor Maskus, the exchange of drugs between African countries
224
could reduce transportation costs, as compared to an exchange between, for example, South Africa and India. Lower transportation
costs further efficient regional distribution. Additionally, if there are
fewer steps in the supply chain, then there will be less of a chance for
225
drug tampering or counterfeiting. Moreover, Africa is not yet in a
position to be completely independent from foreign support. There220

See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text (discussing the Bayer decision).
Treaty of Abuja, supra note 146, art. 73.
222
William Onzivu, Globalism, Regionalism, or Both: Health Policy and Regional Economic Integration in Developing Countries, an Evolution of a Legal Regime? 15 MINN. J.
INT’L L. 111, 163–65 (2006).
223
Id.
224
MASKUS, supra note 202, at 43.
225
See Chuka Odita, Nafdac’s Strategies For Winning, THIS DAY (Lagos, Nig.), Sept.
17, 2009, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200909180048.html (explaining
that in response to counterfeit drug imports from China and India, Nigeria’s National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) is trying to
find ways to increase drug regulation).
221
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fore, a regional parallel trade system should supplement other measures, such as compulsory licensing, to provide affordable drugs. If all
AU countries were to adopt international exhaustion, they may alienate pharmaceutical companies, as well as developed countries that
provide foreign aid, because of the wide scope of international exhaustion. But under regional exhaustion, the mere threat that a
neighboring African country could import a drug may motivate
226
pharmaceutical companies to reduce prices in the region. Regional
exhaustion is a contained, efficient means of exchanging drugs at
lower costs.
Recent findings of significant differences between drug prices in
AU countries reinforce the need to adopt a solution to the drug
problem that accounts for market forces within the AU. Price differentials, coupled with the desire for a single market in the AU and
increased distribution efficiency, mean that regional parallel trade
has the potential to reduce drug costs while serving the interests of
the AU. Although regional exhaustion may be less controversial than
international exhaustion, no solution to the African drug problem
works in isolation. As such, the impact of a regional-based parallel
trade system in the AU on the pharmaceutical industry and the involvement of developed countries must be further reviewed, keeping
in mind the ultimate goal of reducing drug costs.
B. Lower Drug Costs, Strong Regulation, and Robust Intellectual
Property Regimes: Regional Parallel Trade Can Thrive in the
African Union
Adopting regional exhaustion in the AU would introduce both
benefits and concerns, many of which would be unique to Africa.
The potential benefits are evident—lower drug costs, increased economic development, and promotion of regional and national economic and intellectual property interests. Yet strong regulation of
parallel trade is necessary to ensure the safety of the parallel imports
and reduce possible corruption of the system. This will require affirmative work on the part of the AU and cooperation from developed countries. The balance between intellectual property and market forces in the pharmaceutical context hinges on a commitment to

226
See Glaxo Offers Cheaper AIDS Drugs, BBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1182652.stm (noting that as the Kenyan government prepared to introduce a bill that would allow the importation of cheap, generic HIV / AIDS drugs, the pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline promised to
heavily discount AIDS drugs).
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improving public health. Regional parallel trade in the AU offers an
opportunity to further that commitment.
1.

Regional Parallel Trade as a Long-Term Solution
Alongside Drug-Donation Programs to Lower Drug
Costs in the African Union

The establishment of parallel trade based on regional exhaustion in the AU must be considered in light of other drug-pricereduction measures. Regional parallel trade will allow AU consumers
to obtain drugs at lower costs by increasing market competition in
African countries where drug costs are prohibitively high. In addition, regional parallel trade in the AU could make up for the inadequacies in the compulsory licensing system, especially because many
developed countries have been reluctant to put the August 30 Decision regarding paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration into action by
227
producing low-cost drugs for export to developing countries.
Moreover, any profit cuts suffered by the pharmaceutical companies
as a result of parallel trade within the AU would not devastate the
drug industry. The effect of reduced profits has been small in the
228
EU, and drug companies do not typically patent their drugs in Afri229
ca. Many of the essential medicines needed in Africa are for diseases that are far less prevalent in the developed world and would not
230
likely provide pharmaceutical companies with large profits.
Small
reductions in profits are not a sufficient reason to discourage parallel
trade in the AU.
Although Western pharmaceutical companies would likely survive any profit cuts, they may respond to the adoption of parallel
trade in the AU with a reluctance to participate in drug-donation
programs. Pharmaceutical companies have addressed the drug crisis
by donating drugs to developing countries or relief organizations or
231
by offering price discounts.
Although some drug-donation programs have been successful, some companies have imposed stipula227

See supra Part III.C (explaining the history behind the Doha Declaration).
Macarthur, supra note 79, at 9.
229
Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 140, at 1889.
230
See Dolmo, supra note 184, at 161 (“Developing world markets are a very small
income source for the pharmaceutical industry. The market represents only about
10% of international sales and just 1.6% in the continent of Africa.”).
231
Pfizer Donates Drug to South Africa’s Poor, AIDS WKLY., Apr. 17, 2000, at 18–19; see
Albert I. Wertheimer et al., Successful Public/Private Donation Programs: A Review of the
Diflucan Partnership Program in South Africa, 3 J. INT’L ASS’N PHYSICIANS AIDS CARE 74,
74–76 (2004) (summarizing recent drug donation and price reduction initiatives by
pharmaceutical companies).
228
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232

tions on distribution of the donated drugs.
Notably, however, a
partnership between the drug company Pfizer and South Africa has
233
received attention for its cooperative nature. In exchange for free
donation of the drug Diflucan to treat cryptococcal meningitis, a
brain infection that can occur in HIV patients, and registration of the
drug by Pfizer according to South Africa’s requirements, the South
African government agreed to monitor the storage and distribution
of Pfizer’s drug to ensure it was properly administered, secured from
234
theft, and provided to patients free of charge. The program’s success is attributed to the established guidelines and this drug-donation
235
program has expanded to other countries.
In light of pharmaceutical companies’ opposition to parallel imports, they may cut their participation in drug-donation programs in
protest to an established parallel trade system. Parallel imports, however, are not bought or sold for free—they are the original drugs
produced by pharmaceutical companies that have been placed on the
236
market by the company.
Therefore, parallel imports are separate
from drug donations, which are primarily distributed through relief
organizations like the United Nations Children’s Fund or through a
specified program, such as the Diflucan Partnership Program in
237
South Africa. Notably, Pfizer was willing to establish a partnership
238
with South Africa after South Africa implemented parallel trade,
which demonstrates that both solutions can coexist. Moreover, parallel trade is a long-term solution that does not require reliance on a
donation program with an unknown duration. Pharmaceutical companies would still earn revenue from the drugs they initially placed

232
Henry & Lexchin, supra note 23, at 1590. Drug-donation programs are not
without their concerns. An overall fear is that such programs are a means for pharmaceutical companies to keep drug prices high worldwide while helping developing
countries. Id. Doctors Without Borders takes the position that spending money on
generic drug development would be a more sustained method of supplying drugs
than donation programs. Id. at 1590–91. The WHO developed guidelines to ensure
the safety of donated drugs. Id. at 1591.
233
Wertheimer et al., supra note 231, at 78.
234
Id. at 76–77; Pfizer Donates Drug to South Africa’s Poor, supra note 231, at 18–19.
235
Wertheimer et al., supra note 231, at 76–77.
236
See EURACTIV, supra note 25 (“[P]arallel trade only offers the original products
of the industry itself . . . .”).
237
Wertheimer et al., supra note 231, at 74; Pfizer Donates Drug to South Africa’s Poor,
supra note 231, at 18–19.
238
South Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act in 1997. Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of
1997, supra note 35. The Diflucan Partnership Program was created in 2000. Pfizer
Donates Drug to South Africa’s Poor, supra note 231, at 18–19.
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on the market. Drug-donation programs are philanthropic measures
and should not be used as a threat against the free-market competition that results from parallel trade.
Another fear is that traders may use the donated drugs as parallel imports in profiteering schemes, which also may stop pharmaceutical companies from donating drugs. Strong restrictions on the use
of donated drugs as parallel imports will be required. South Africa,
in its partnership with Pfizer, has already shown a willingness to regu239
late the distribution of donated drugs.
Similar regulations can be
incorporated into the registration requirements for parallel imports.
For example, in South Africa, as in the EU, traders must register the
drug that they wish to import, provide information about the expor240
ter, and comply with repackaging criteria. These disclosure stipulations can serve as safeguards against traders who attempt to repackage and sell donated drugs in African countries. Strict guidelines for
parallel imports would reassure pharmaceutical companies that donated drugs will not become a part of parallel trade. Drug-donation
programs can work alongside the free competition inherent in parallel trade to reduce drug costs in the AU.
2.

Parallel Trade Within the African Union as a Stimulus
for Economic Growth

A regional exhaustion system would encourage free trade and
leverage economic development within Africa. The EU system is flexible enough to include new member countries and new drugs as it
expands and similar growth could occur in the AU as it moves toward
an integrated market. Additionally, the efficiency of local production
241
will increase.
For example, the drug company Quality Chemical
Industries Limited (QCIL) recently opened a plant to produce mala242
ria and antiretroviral drugs in Uganda. Because of a small market,
239

Wertheimer et al., supra note 231, at 76–77.
See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text (outlining the parallel trade requirements in South Africa).
241
See Harrelson, supra note 81, at 195 (“One attractive aspect of parallel importing for many African nations is that they lack the local capacity to manufacture
needed pharmaceuticals even if they require compulsory licensing.”).
242
Roger Bate, When Local Production Is Not the Answer, THE AMERICAN (Sept. 2,
2009),
http://www.american.com/archive/2009/september/bernarticle.2009-0901.0954500383.
The Ugandan private market size is too small for QCIL to benefit from
economies of scale, which means its prices are likely to be high. . . .
QCIL cannot compete and probably never will. . . . QCIL wants a 15
percent tariff against cheaper, quality-assured foreign drugs. And
QCIL is not alone; the rest of the industry in Uganda wants protection,
240
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QCIL is unlikely to compete with foreign-produced drugs that are of243
fered at lower prices. Instead of each AU country trying to support
its own producer, a regional parallel trade system could enable producers in countries like Uganda to increase their market size and sell
to other African countries within a REC without the fear of competing with imports from India. Furthermore, in addition to working
towards the goal of a common African market, strong regional coalitions promote strengthened representation of the coalition countries
244
in the WTO. Regional exhaustion will contribute to strengthening
the RECs economically.
One of the reasons that the EU parallel trade system has endured is because it is supported by strong political and judicial oversight. Although the AU Commission, unlike the European Commis245
sion, does not have powers of its own, the AU could oversee a
regional parallel trade system in other ways. The Protocol on the Es246
tablishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights and
247
the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union both establish judicial review options for implementing legal principles and
248
resolving disputes and have jurisdiction over the RECs.
The Pan
249
African Parliament, charged with implementing AU policies and
objectives, has law-making powers and could work to coordinate and
harmonize health policy and intellectual property laws between

for the same reasons as QCIL, as do producers in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, and the rest of the continent. Tanzania has put in place
a 10 percent tariff on [foreign] drug imports.
Id.
243

Id.
See Ryan L. Vinelli, Note, Bringing Down the Walls: How Technology Is Being Used to
Thwart Parallel Importers Amid the International Confusion Concerning Exhaustion of Rights,
17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 135, 166 (2009).
245
See supra note 150 and accompanying text (explaining the role of the AU
Commission).
246
Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples Rights, OAU Doc.OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PRO(1) Rev.1
(1997), available at http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/court_en.html.
247
Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, July 11, 2003, available at
http://www.au.int/files/PROTOCOL_COURT_OF_JUSTICE_OF_THE_AFRICAN_
UNION.pdf.
248
Id. art. 19; Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples, supra note 246, art. 3; Onzivu, supra note 222, at 160–
63.
249
Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating
to the Pan-African Parliament art. 2, Mar. 2, 2001, available at
http://www.africanreview.org/docs/civsoc/pap.pdf.
244
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250

member countries.
As these entities are relatively young, their ca251
pabilities have yet to be fully tested. Looking to EU institutions as a
model for promoting a common market could assist entities like the
Pan African Parliament in regulating a regional parallel trade sys252
tem.
Following South Africa and the EU, RECs could implement
similar licensing and labeling requirements for importers within their
region. The relative success of RECs, such as the Economic Community of the West African States, which has worked towards free trade
253
and set up a regional health organization, demonstrates that regional regulation is possible in the AU.
Strong regulation of parallel trade by AU entities is necessary to
establish and maintain the system. AU countries, in implementing
regional parallel trade, would have to ensure that the parallel imports
did not make their way back to high-income markets, where traders
254
could resell them at higher price to make a profit. Likewise, developed countries should ban parallel imports from developing coun255
tries to ensure that the drugs reach the intended recipients.
Although enforcement in both cases may prove difficult, preventing re256
importation is necessary to maintain “pro-poor” differential pricing.
The WTO has recognized that differential pricing between developed
and developing countries helps promote access to affordable drugs in
developing countries while encouraging continued research and de257
velopment of new drugs.
Implementing parallel trade in the AU
would remedy the significant price differences between developing
African countries. An AU regional parallel trade system is not meant,
however, to address price differences between developed and developing countries that correspond to national wealth. Such prices differences enable pharmaceutical companies to provide lower-priced
drugs to developing countries because of continued revenue from

250

Onzivu, supra note 222, at 163.
Id. at 160–63.
252
See Richard Frimpong Oppong, Private International Law in Africa: The Past,
Present, and Future, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 677, 715 (2007) (“The European Union jurisprudence may, however, become very useful in forging the African common market
as envisaged under the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.”).
253
Onzivu, supra note 222, at 163–64.
254
Matthews & Munoz-Tellez, supra note 11, at 1431–32.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
WORLD HEALTH ORG. & WORLD TRADE ORG. SECRETARIATS, REPORT OF THE
WORKSHOP ON DIFFERENTIAL PRICING AND FINANCING OF ESSENTIAL DRUGS 2 (Apr. 8−11,
2001),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/
hosbjor_report_e.pdf.
251
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258

developed countries. Therefore, parallel imports exchanged within
the AU must not be exported to high-income countries. This measure will ensure that the pricing scheme between developed and developing countries is not undermined. A significant reduction in
revenue from sales in developed countries would hinder the ability of
pharmaceutical companies to offer drugs at lower prices in developing countries and only worsen the drug crisis in Africa.
Moreover, robust oversight is needed in the AU to prevent corruption of the free-trade market that grows with a parallel-import regime. Strict regulations are necessary to prevent a parallel-import industry built on counterfeit drugs and to reduce safety concerns over
drug tampering. The risk of consuming unsafe drugs would seriously
inhibit the parallel trade system. Another concern, which reflects the
price differential issue discussed above, is that government officials
may attempt to create a secondary market by diverting cheap parallel
imports to wealthy countries for profit. Although such activity is difficult to predict, perhaps the best proof that a parallel trade regime
in Africa can thrive is illustrated through South Africa’s adoption of
parallel trade for the chief purpose of increasing access to affordable
drugs and improving the health of its citizens. Although concerns
over corruption reflect the high stakes that accompany implementation of free trade in the AU, the overwhelming need for affordable
drugs is a strong impetus for AU entities to create regulations that
promote the success of parallel trade.
3.

Using Regional Parallel Trade to Shape Intellectual
Property Protection in the Best Interests of the African
Union

Developing countries in Africa have the opportunity to define or
redefine their patent regimes because developing countries have until 2016 to become TRIPS compliant and offer pharmaceutical pa259
tents. Although many African countries have established patent re260
gimes, intellectual property protection is not strongly regarded in
Africa, evidenced by the fact that many developed-world drug com261
Becoming TRIPS companies do not apply for patents in Africa.
pliant is an opportunity for governments to determine what degree of
258

See Henry & Lexchin, supra note 23, at 1594.
Press Release, World Trade Org., supra note 31.
260
See supra note 152 and accompanying text (listing a sample of African countries
with patent acts).
261
See Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 140, at 1889 (finding that many antiretroviral drugs are not patented in Africa).
259
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intellectual property protection they want to offer to best meet their
domestic needs. Intellectual property regimes are an important aspect of a common economic community and can ultimately lead to
stronger international presence and facilitate free trade and market
integration.
As developing countries attempt to define the contours of their
intellectual property systems, the difficulty in balancing the goals of
such a system against a humanitarian crisis is apparent. A respectable
patent-law system affords adequate protection to inventors. But with
such protection comes reluctance on the part of the patent holder to
give up the exclusive rights to make, use, and sell the product. As
such, prior to the TRIPS Agreement, many developing countries had
weak patent regimes because they felt that strong patent protection
262
favored foreigners at the expense of local producers. This concern
is questionable in light of the fact that many pharmaceutical compa263
nies do not patent drugs in Africa. Furthermore, there is a growing
consensus that countries with strong intellectual property systems attract more foreign direct investment than countries without such sys264
tems. Facilitating regional parallel trade in the AU could be a first
step towards creating a robust intellectual property regime that prioritizes the needs of local consumers, particularly in light of the public health crisis. Adopting the doctrine of regional exhaustion in the
AU would give notice to industries in developed countries that an established intellectual property regime exists in Africa. Moreover, as
in the EU, regional exhaustion in the AU would mean parallel imports from outside the region are not permitted and thus an assured
degree of intellectual property protection is provided. Regional exhaustion in the AU would reflect the need for affordable drugs and
the value in respecting intellectual property rights.

262

Harrelson, supra note 81, at 179.
Attaran & Gillespie-White, supra note 142, at 1889.
264
Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 76, at 218. For insight into the effect of
changing intellectual property law, see Ghosh, supra note 190, at 816–17. Brazil
enacted patent legislation in 1996 to comply with the TRIPS Agreement. Id. at 816.
But “the legislation exempts patent protection for anything that was commercialized
anywhere in the world prior to May 14, 1997.” Id. Therefore, patentees who sold
their patented goods anywhere in the world prior to May 14, 1997 have exhausted
their rights. Id. As a result, the price of drugs with no generic equivalent in Brazil
dropped 9% from 1996 to 2000 and the price of drugs with generic equivalents
manufactured in Brazil dropped 79%. Id. Brazil’s model may not be an option for
some African countries (for countries that already have patent laws, retroactive legislation would not be helpful), but parallel trade may be an effective option. Id. at
816–17.
263
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Implementing regional exhaustion in the AU is unlikely to occur
without controversy from the intellectual property law community.
The Revised Bangui Agreement, which governs African countries participating in the African Intellectual Property Organization, has, in
essence, created a microcosm of a regional parallel trade system in
Africa. International organizations, however, expressed criticism because of the restrictive approach in prohibiting parallel imports from
265
outside the OAPI region.
Given these concerns and the fact that
countries like South Africa already import drugs from outside Afri266
ca, regional parallel trade should act only as a supplementary
means of bringing affordable drugs to Africa. Africa must not isolate
itself with respect to any solution implemented to address the public
health crisis. Significant cooperation within Africa as a continent
and, most importantly, with developed countries is needed. Although regionalism is an efficient means of promoting public health
within a group of select countries, any approach taken must be flexible and adaptable to the changing needs of AU consumers and ac267
commodate the goal of a common African market. Regional parallel trade contributes to this goal by reducing drug costs in countries
where it is most needed and shaping market forces and intellectual
property law to best serve the interests of the AU.
V. CONCLUSION
A parallel trade system based on regional exhaustion should be
implemented in the AU. The AU has a strong desire for cohesion
and a unified economic market—factors that motivated the EU to
adopt a functioning, enduring parallel trade system. Africa already
has created RECs to promote the free-trade movement. An even
stronger reason for regional parallel trade than existed in the EU is
present in the AU—the need for essential drugs. Although many political, social, and economic factors must be considered, reviewing the
265

See generally COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, supra note 158, at 161 (“[The Revised Bangui Agreement] does not explicitly allow parallel imports . . . .”); World
Health Org., supra note 158, at 35 (expressing concern over the strict conditions on
intellectual property in the Revised Bangui Agreement); Sell, supra note 159, at 385–
86 (characterizing the Revised Bangui Agreement “Trips Plus”); Press Release,
Médecins San Frontières, supra note 157 (explaining the objections of the WHO and
Doctors Without Borders to the Revised Bangui Agreement).
266
Kenya has also adopted international exhaustion. See Shianya, supra note 8.
267
Onzivu, supra note 222, at 186 (“It is important that developing countries actively participate in inter-national law and policy making to promote the public
health of their people. However, the way forward for developing countries is to work
to ensure that the new regionalism in which they participate fully meets the health
goals of member states.”).
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drug crisis from the perspective of patent law and drawing on the EU
experience demonstrates that a similar system has the potential to
work in Africa. Significant price differences exist between drugs in
African countries. Parallel trade on a regional level can address this
situation by increasing free-market competition and lowering drug
costs. The AU is in the process of developing and strengthening governing entities that can serve to regulate such a system. Now is the
time to strike a balance between health policy and intellectual property law that truly works in the best interests of the AU.
The pharmaceutical drug crisis in Africa calls for comprehensive
consideration of all potential solutions. Importantly, any solution
must be considered primarily from the perspective of African consumers. With respect to parallel trade, the current focus is on the
negative aspects of international exhaustion. But policymakers and
scholars should fully consider regional exhaustion as well. The parallel-import market only shows signs of growing in the EU. Outside the
EU, parallel trade is becoming increasingly common as countries like
India expand their manufacturing capabilities and countries like
South Africa, desperate for essential medicines, attempt to leverage
this trade mechanism. Instead of looking outside the continent, Africa is a potential arena for a parallel trade system based on regional
exhaustion. Regional parallel trade could play an important role in
increasing access to pharmaceutical drugs and, coupled with continued international support, could provide another piece of the puzzle
to alleviate the drug crisis in Africa.

